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RUMORS OF THE SHARIA THREAT ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED
I.	INTRODUCTION

The campaign to ban Muslim religious law, known as Sharia, in American
courtrooms argues that judicial accommodation of any religious law is inappropriate
in an American secular courtroom. At first blush, the argument seems to have
merit—the idea of religious law in a secular liberal democracy seems to fly in the face
of our rule of law. It seems to contrast with the principle of equality, which states
that we all (regardless of race, status, or religion) are held to the same rules. In the
United Kingdom, the sentiment is summed up in a campaign titled “One Law for
All.”1 Here in the United States, the argument appears as the title of the latest
iteration of Sharia-ban legislation: “American Law for American Courts.”2 The idea
is simple: all Americans should be bound by the same American laws. This seems to
be an unassailable principle—until one looks more closely at American law itself.
First, “American law” is not one law; it differs from state to state, and federalism
protects this diversity. Much of an American citizen’s life is controlled not by uniform
federal law, but by different state laws, which change every time she crosses a state
border, and legal principles like comity facilitate mutual state respect for these
different laws. Comity also extends to judicial accommodation of foreign law when
relevant, such as in the adjudication of a contract with a foreign choice of law clause.
And even beyond this, litigating parties in America are regularly encouraged to use
alternative dispute resolution to resolve their disputes out of court, often producing
results that are significantly different than those which would have resulted under
straight judicial application of “American law.”
Separate from state law, the American rule of law has always considered issues of
accommodations of religious minorities seeking to follow rules that differ from
American secular legal norms. In other words, Sharia is by no means the first
religious law to be presented in American courts. Two centuries of case law involving
religious-based requests from American Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Native
Americans, and others has resulted in several established policies and practices that
American judges use to adjudicate requests for consideration of religious law. In
short, requests for consideration of religious law are balanced with constitutional and
legislative principles, using judicial tools such as comity, public policy, and
unconscionability.3 Because many Americans are unaware of this established practice,
the anti-Sharia campaign has been able to create a concern that judicial consideration
of Sharia-based claims from Muslim American litigants is compromising American
law and values. The case law, however, shows a different picture. Judicial treatment
of Sharia requests is not threatening the American rule of law, it is an illustration of
1.

See One L. for All, www.onelawforall.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).

2.

See the legislation promoted by the American Public Policy Alliance. Am. Pub. Pol’y Alliance,
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=122 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).

3.

For a summary of the current practice, with a commentary on how this judicial approach could be
improved (by expanding the application of unconscionability and limiting the application of public
policy), see Michael Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231 (2011).
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it. As with requests from other American religious groups, sometimes Sharia requests
win, and sometimes they don’t. Reasonable minds differ over whether the courts get
it right each time. But in every case, the job of the judge is a careful balancing of
rights against each other, not an automatic trumping of religious practice by secular
law or vice versa.
The campaign to ban Sharia in the United States appears to be directed at two
different alleged threats: (1) that Sharia will take over American law, and (2) that
judicial accommodation of Muslim religious practices is eroding our secular rule of
law. The first is a non-issue: there is no real chance that Sharia will replace American
law or our Constitution. But the second is worth talking about. It asks a question
crucial to the nature of our secular constitutional democracy: Can we legally
accommodate a diversity of religious legal practices among our citizens and, if so,
with what limits?4 I will address one aspect of this question by summarizing in Part
II how Islamic family law5 is currently accommodated in American courtrooms today
and discussing in Part III why this does not threaten women’s rights or our American
rule of law. In Part IV, I consider the global and domestic implications of Muslim
American tribunals serving the dispute resolution needs of American Muslims. Part
V concludes.
II.	THE ACCOMMODATION OF ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN AMERICAN COURTROOMS

A. Legal Validity of Religious Marriages and Divorces

Looking over the field of cases involving Islamic family law issues, there are
several recurring topics.6 One is the validity of Islamic marriages and divorces
themselves.7 Because civil and religious marriages have different rules, some Muslim
couples perform a religious ceremony, but do not obtain a marriage license from the

4.

This is not a simple question. It brings up compelling and complex issues of legal and political theory,
none of which I have the space to engage here. For a recent publication collecting commentary on the
question with direct reference to the question of Sharia in the West, see generally Shari’a in the West
(Rex Adhar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010).

5.

My focus here is Islamic family law as it is addressed in American courts, not the substantive doctrines of
Islamic family law itself. The latter is a much larger topic than there is room for here, but for a good
summary, see Kecia Ali, Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines, in The Islamic
Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law 11 (Asifa Quraishi & Frank Vogel
eds., 2008).

6.

A useful website documenting major American cases addressing Sharia, with brief case summaries and
some commentary, is the “Sharia Index,” maintained by Abed Awad and Noura Jebara. See Sharia in
America: The Role of Shari’a Law in U.S. Courts, http://shariainamerica.com (last visited Sept.
18, 2012).

7.

There are several cases involving the legitimacy of marriages and divorces conducted in foreign Muslimmajority countries. I do not detail those here because they usually center on questions of comity to the
law of foreign jurisdictions more than the question of American consideration of Sharia, which I believe
is the more relevant question for most American Muslims and the issue presented by the anti-Sharia
campaign.
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state. If this happens for a polygamous marriage8 or the marriage of a minor child,9
the state will not recognize these marriages as valid as a general matter of public
policy. Outside of these situations, the legal validity of a religious marriage will
depend upon the jurisdiction. In some states, a marriage without a license is void; in
others, it is voidable, leaving the possibility that with evidence of a “putative marriage”
(defined on secular terms) it may nevertheless be found valid.10
Purely religious divorces, on the other hand, are not recognized by state law
because states claim exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over marriage dissolution.
This means that a divorce that is valid under Islamic law, but does not comport with
state law, will not usually be considered a legal divorce and, most importantly, will
not affect the state’s legal dissolution of the parties’ financial matters.11 This is
especially relevant to Muslim religious divorces because, of the three types of divorces
recognized in Islamic law (talaq, khul’, and faskh12), two can occur extra-judicially
with no one other than the couple involved at all. One of these two extra-judicial
divorces, talaq, does not even involve the wife. Under classical Islamic law, a talaq
divorce can be performed unilaterally by a husband with just a declaration of words
and without the consent or participation of the wife. Talaq divorces have been rejected
as against public policy by some American judges because of their lack of due process
and their unequal treatment of the wife.13 Public policy also guides consideration of
gendered (and patriarchal) child custody and guardianship rules found in Islamic
family law: they are honored only if they are found to be consistent with the “best
interests of the child” standard demanded by public policy.14
8.

The marriage of the first wife may be recognized, but not those of women married after the first. For
commentary on this phenomenon, and the disadvantages in which it places “later wives,” see Asifa
Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in
Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law: Perspectives on Reform 179, 192–94 (Lynn Welchman
ed., 2004).

9.

See, e.g., People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1976) (charging the defendant with
endangering the welfare of a child by arranging the minor child’s marriage).

10.

See, e.g., Vryonis v. Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding invalid a religious
marriage without evidence of public representations of married life).

11.

A recent example is Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 719 S.E.2d 192 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), in which the North
Carolina Court of Appeals recognized a couple’s Muslim marriage, but not their Muslim religious
divorce. 719 S.E.2d at 194–95; see also Abed Awad & Noura Michelle, Appeals Court Had the Chance to
Do Right by a Wife and Children—But Declined It, N.C. Law. Wkly. (Dec. 26, 2011), available at http://
nclawyersweekly.com/2011/12/23/appeals-court-had-the-chance-to-do-right-by-a-wife-and-children–-but-declined-it/ (arguing that the result was consistent with state law, but that the dissenting opinion
would have better served justice without unsettling the law of the land that religious divorces do not
legally dissolve marriages under state law).

12.

See Ali, supra note 5, at 23.

13.

See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 502 (Md. 2008) (holding that a talaq that was allowed in Pakistan
was unenforceable in Maryland because, by being accessible only to men and not to women, talaq was
against public policy under the Equal Rights Amendment of the Maryland Constitution, and also deprived
women of the due process they would be entitled to when they initiate a divorce in Maryland).

14.

See, e.g., Malik v. Malik, 638 A.2d 1184 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). The court remanded the case,
noting that both Pakistan and Maryland had jurisdiction, and that it would be rare for the second home
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B. Enforcement of Mahr

The most commonly litigated Islamic family law issue in American courts is
probably mahr. A mahr is an agreement for a specified gift from a groom to the bride,
and is a necessary clause of any valid Muslim marriage contract. The substance of
the mahr itself can be anything of value agreed upon by the couple, and can range
significantly in nature—from a small token of little monetary value, to jewelry or
other personal property, to thousands of dollars or a piece of real estate. The mahr
that a couple agrees upon will depend largely on their individual desires and social
context. A mahr is often divided into two portions—one given at the time of the
wedding and a later portion deferred to a later event, usually the death of the husband
or divorce of the parties.
There are different theories about the concept and purpose of the mahr.15 One of
its legal consequences is to designate and preserve some independent property for
married women, which might be quite important for women who want to maintain
their financial independence but choose not to pursue a career outside the home. A
large deferred mahr can also deter husbands from divorcing wives who do not wish to
be divorced because a man who divorces his wife by unilateral talaq must pay the full,
deferred mahr at that time.
Because the mahr is often a financial sum—and sometimes a quite significant
sum—it can become a crucial and often contentious element during negotiations of
the dissolution of assets during a divorce. Requests for judicial enforcement of mahr
bring up an interesting aspect of American judicial treatment of Sharia claims
because, as a clause of a contract, mahr claims invoke an important principle of
American law: freedom of contract. Because of the importance of the meeting of the
minds in American contract law, most state judges treat a mahr clause as they do any
other contract clause; it is enforced unless: (1) it violates some basic rule of contract
law (e.g., the contract terms are unclear or there is coercion), or (2) its application
would violate public policy. The fact that the clause itself was inspired by religious
law is usually irrelevant to this larger respect for contractual intent. In the words of
one New Jersey judge,
why should a contract for the promise to pay money be less of a contract just
because it was entered into at the time of an Islamic marriage ceremony? . . .
Clearly, this Court can enforce a contract which is not in contravention of
established law or public policy . . . . If this Court can apply “neutral principles of

state to assume jurisdiction where a party disobeyed a custody order imposed by the first home state,
with an exception if the Pakistani court did not apply the best interest of the child standard. Id. at
1191–92. The court further noted that Pakistan’s preference toward paternal custody was not necessarily
against Maryland public policy—being similar to the now-outdated Maryland maternal preference, but,
to be granted comity, the husband would have to prove that the Pakistani court exercised a best interest
of the child standard in reaching its decision. Id. at 1191.
15.

For some commentary, see Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 8, at 206.
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law” to the enforcement of a Mahr Agreement, though religious in appearance,
then the Mahr Agreement survives any constitutional implications.16

Thus, American judges often give respect to a mahr clause as a matter of simple
contract law. Sometimes American Muslim couples write their mahr clauses with
very ambiguous, unclear terms, often resulting in their mahr clause not being
enforced. For example, a mahr for “a ring advanced and half of husband’s possessions
postponed ” was not enforced because the court concluded that this language left too
much of the financial calculations unclear.17 Another aspect of basic contract law
that can prove fatal to a mahr clause is coercion: American judges have declined to
enforce mahr clauses if they conclude there was coercion or a lack of understanding
by one of the parties.18
In one case, the California Court of Appeals declined to enforce a mahr agreement
(despite its clear terms) because the court considered it to be a mechanism for the
wife’s “profiteering by divorce” and, therefore, it was against public policy (similar to
the state’s public policy against enforcing prenuptial agreements that “facilitate
divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in the event of such an
occurrence”).19 It might be noted that, in the written opinion, this court displayed an
incomplete understanding of classical Islamic law regarding deferred mahr because it
is not always the case that a wife will receive her mahr when she initiates a divorce.
To the contrary, unlike talaq divorces initiated by the husband, in khul’ and faskh
divorces that are usually initiated by the wife, it is often the case that the wife ends
up forfeiting her mahr as a part of the dissolution. 20 Thus, the court’s comments
16.

Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95, 97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see also Aziz v. Aziz, 488
N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1985) (awarding $5,000 deferred mahr “enforceable as a
contractual obligation, notwithstanding that it was entered into as part of a religious ceremony”); Akileh
v. Elchahal, 666 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the essential terms of the marriage
contract, considered as a prenuptial agreement, to be met, and awarding the wife $50,000 in deferred
mahr).

17.

Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty.
July 10, 1995) (finding it unproblematic as a matter of state law to enforce a mahr agreement, but
nevertheless declining to enforce it in this particular case because of vague language).

18.

In re Marriage of Obaidi & Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 790–91 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (declining to
enforce a mahr agreement on neutral principles of contract law, namely, lack of mutual assent); Zawahiri
v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008) (judging a
Muslim marriage contract as a prenuptial agreement and denying enforcement of the mahr provision
because facts demonstrated overreaching and coercion).

19.

In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872–73 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted) (noting the
Jewish kethuba also facilitated divorce).

20. See Ali, supra note 5, at 23–24. From my reading of the court opinion, this misunderstanding was partly

created by exaggerated claims about Islamic family law made by the attorneys on both sides. First, the
husband’s lawyer insisted that a mahr is awarded only when a husband initiates a divorce. This is a
partial truth; in classical Islamic family law, a wife is generally awarded her mahr even if she initiates a
faskh divorce, as long as sufficient grounds of harm (from husband to wife) are shown. Instead of
clarifying this point, the wife’s lawyer in this case made the equally exaggerated claim that a wife is
entitled to her mahr regardless of who initiates the divorce. That is, again, a partial truth; it is true of
faskh divorces where harm is shown, but it is not generally true in wife-initiated khul’ divorces, for
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about mahr being a “profiteering” mechanism reveal that its policy decision not to
accommodate Sharia was based on a basic misunderstanding of mahr. Nevertheless,
this case serves as a useful illustration of a basic principle underlying all judicial
treatment of Muslim marriage contracts in the United States: when a Sharia-based
claim is found to violate public policy, it is not enforced. This is an important
assurance for anyone concerned that judicial accommodation of Sharia-based claims
is causing our legal system to enforce religious practices that offend American law
and values. The case law illustrates how the public policy control is set up to assure
this does not happen.
III.	A BROADER Sharia PICTURE: Sharia Discourse IN AMERICA AND THE ISSUE
OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Viewed together, these cases show that, when considering Sharia-based requests
in their courtrooms, American judges neither react with an automatic rejection of
Sharia, nor do they give it wholesale deference without considering public policy and
general constitutional principles. Yet the campaign to ban Sharia in American courts
insists that the status quo does not go far enough. Bills to ban Sharia take the
approach that, rather than rejecting individual Sharia-based requests when they
violate public policy, judges should always view Sharia with suspicion. This comes
from a presumption that Sharia is itself contrary to American law and values and,
some even argue that it is a political-military movement set out to take over the
world.21 Most Americans dismiss the “Sharia-as-world-takeover” warning as rhetorical
exaggeration, but, nevertheless, the idea that Sharia-as-Islamic-law is generally a bad
idea—especially for women—does resonate with many Americans. This is important
because few Americans have any appreciation for either how Sharia might be seen as
a positive force in Muslim lives, or what a Sharia ban could mean for American
Muslims. I believe there are several important, largely overlooked, features of Sharia,
and especially its role in women’s rights, that merit brief attention.
First, it should be clarified that Sharia itself is not a uniform monolithic code of
legal rules, but instead is manifested in several different schools of law. From the
perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, Sharia is the perfect Law of God, but the specific
rules that are extrapolated from scripture are a human creation. These humanly
reasons quite similar to the public policy concerns expressed by the California appellate court—namely,
that if a woman pursues a divorce even where the husband is not at fault, then she should not get a
windfall of the deferred mahr. What the California court did not appreciate (apparently based on the
exaggerated argument from the wife’s attorney) was that in the case of a faskh Islamic divorce, a wife
might be seeking divorce because of harm from her husband, in which case the mahr is not a mechanism
for “profiteering” by divorce, but rather a mechanism for having the financial independence sufficient to
support herself once she is able to get out of an unfortunate marriage (especially important if she was
financially dependent upon him during the marriage).
21.

For example, the original Tennessee Sharia ban legislative proposal (before it was amended) defined
Sharia as a “legal-political-military doctrine . . . requir[ing] the abrogation, destruction, or violation of
the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the imposition of Sharia through violence and
criminal activity.” S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2011), available at http://www.
capitol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Bill/SB1028.pdf.
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created legal rules, called “ fiqh” (literally, “understanding”), multiplied with the
diversity of Muslim jurists over time. Yet, because of the ever-present possibility of
human error none could claim with certainty to have the correct understanding of
God’s Law as against all others. Therefore, all scholarly efforts to articulate the rules
of Sharia must be accepted, creating a multiplicity of fiqh schools (and their
corresponding legal doctrines) from which individual Muslims can choose as they
seek to live by Sharia.22
Second, the Sharia-ban campaign often quotes some “offensive” fiqh rules to argue
that Sharia oppresses women and is therefore antithetical to American values.23 For
those unfamiliar with Islamic jurisprudence, this argument sounds damning,
especially when classical fiqh texts are quoted. But a basic appreciation of the difference
between Sharia and fiqh reveals the conceptual error in such assertions. Quoting one
(or even more than one) fiqh rule does not define Sharia any more than quoting Plessy
v. Ferguson defines the U.S. Constitution.24 After all, it was not the Constitution that
endorsed the oppression of black schoolchildren in the United States; it was one
interpretation of the Constitution that did so. Therefore, while there are quite a few
gender-discriminatory rules in the collections of fiqh, Muslims are not Islamically
obligated to follow them simply because they exist in the fiqh doctrine. This principle
is part of the epistemology of fiqh itself: because no fiqh rule can conclusively claim to
be “the” correct understanding of Sharia, no fiqh rule is—in and of itself—binding on
any Muslim. Moreover, because the diversity of fiqh interpretations of Sharia continues
to evolve and grow even today, many Muslim scholars (men and women) are actively
engaging in creating new fiqh alternatives to many of the gender-specific rules (such
as unilateral talaq and patriarchal child custody rules).25
Moreover, Islamic legal reform is not the only answer for those concerned about
women’s rights under Sharia. It is important to recognize that not all existing fiqh is
“bad” for women. This goes largely unnoticed by feminists in the West, but there are
several aspects of classical fiqh that many Muslim women find quite empowering
22.

For more detail on Islamic jurisprudential theory and how it created several different schools of law, see
generally Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text,
Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 67 (2006).

23.

For example, the website Breitbart.com contains an article asserting the following:

Shariah institutionalizes discrimination against women, deprives people of freedom of
expression and association, criminalizes sexual freedom, and incites hatred and violence
against people of certain social groups. As manifested in countries officially ruled by
Islamic law, shariah condones or commands abhorrent behavior, including underage and
forced marriage, “honor killing” (usually of women and girls) to preserve family “honor,”
female genital mutilation, polygamy and domestic abuse, and even marital rape.

Team B, What is ‘Shariah’?, Breitbart (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2010/09/17/
What-Is-Shariah; see also Team B II, The Ctr. for Sec. Policy, Shariah: The Threat to America:
An Exercise in Competitive Analysis (Oct. ed. 2010), available at http://shariahthethreat.org/.
24.

See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding separate but equal was constitutional).

25.

There are far too many examples to list here, but some examples are noted in Asifa Quraishi, What If
Sharia Weren’t the Enemy?: Rethinking International Women’s Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 Colum.
J. Gender & L. 173, 215–25 (2011).
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and important to maintaining their independence and organizing their lives. For
example, all classical fiqh schools agree that a woman’s property is exclusively her
own—no one can ever assert any legal claim over it, including all male relatives and
husbands. Those familiar with women’s rights under common law should recognize
that this fourteen-hundred-year-old fiqh rule is quite different than the property
rules that used to apply to American women. Under the common law, women were
not only limited in their ability to acquire property of their own (for example, through
restrictions on the ability to contract in their own names), but they also lost separate
ownership of their property upon marriage when it then became the property of their
husbands. The adoption of community property principles (borrowed from civil law)
by some states presented a radical departure from this scheme because these principles
designated and protected the property that women brought with them into a marriage
as their own separate property, and gave women ownership interests in the property
acquired by both the husband and wife during the marriage.26
When compared to classical Islamic law, however, community property is not
necessarily a woman-empowering move forward. If you begin from the position that
a woman’s property is her exclusive property, then community property (by
transforming all assets and income earned during the marriage into marital property
shared equally with one’s husband) actually takes away the property rights granted to
a woman under Islamic law. As an illustration, consider this hypothetical: imagine
that Leila is a young professional with a high salary and a successful career. Assuming
that her income would be exclusively her own, upon marriage she opted for a very
low mahr, figuring that she would not need to rely on it if she were to end up single
again. If Leila ends up divorcing in a community property state, a marital dissolution
would award her ex-husband half of all the assets Leila acquired during the marriage.
This could put her in a financial position far inferior to the one that she was expecting
under Islamic law (specifically, the principle of exclusive female ownership of
women’s property), especially if the marital property brought into the marriage by
her now-ex-husband was very small. From Leila’s perspective, community property
would not give her more property rights; it would cut them in half.27
Another provision from classical fiqh that promotes women’s financial
independence upon divorce is the rule that considers a wife’s household work to be
financially compensable. Under classical fiqh, housework is not a wife’s legal
obligation, so those who do so can in some cases be financially compensated for this

26. See Caroline B. Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of the Community Property System, Why

California Adopted It, and Why Community Property Principles Benefit Women, 11 U. Md. L.J. Race,
Religion, Gender & Class 1, 2–13 (2011).

27.

Had she known of the community property consequences, Leila might have argued for a much larger
deferred mahr to offset the potential future loss—although, as the cases above illustrate, it is no
guarantee that an American court will honor a mahr agreement. Alternatively, Leila could have opted
out of community property with a valid prenuptial agreement, but this solution is not ideal because few
newlywed couples are fully aware of the legal consequences of community property, much less the state
in which they will be living if and when they divorce.
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work.28 This rule can have important financial consequences in the dissolution of a
marriage in which the husband earned a large salary while the wife maintained the
home. Yet this aspect of fiqh is rarely raised in Muslim family law cases in America.
Instead, Muslim husbands in these cases often argue that the contractual mahr is the
sum total of the wife’s rights under Islamic law, and that the wife should receive
nothing in alimony or through any equitable distribution of property.29 In such cases,
given the significant financial disadvantage in which this resolution would put the
wife, many American judges have rejected these purported Sharia arguments as
against public policy. What is not acknowledged in these cases, however, is that the
mahr clause of a Muslim marriage contract (unlike a prenuptial agreement) is not
meant to constitute a full division of property upon divorce under classical fiqh.
Rather, the mahr is just one part of a complex interconnected network of Islamic
property laws that could include not only compensation for housework, but also
women’s exclusive ownership of their property, men’s exclusive financial household
support obligations, and gendered inheritance laws, to name just a few. Thus, in the
case of a long-term marriage between a career husband and a stay-at-home wife, a
Muslim judge might award the wife her mahr, plus compensation for the financial
value of all of her housework over the course of the marriage (which could amount to
as much as or perhaps even more than the distribution under state law).
In other words, even classical fiqh rules can accomplish women-empowering
goals similar to secular American laws, but they operate within a different framework
and start from different premises. As a result, it is overreaching to assume that all
Sharia-based rules offend American legal values of gender fairness. Indeed, rather
than rescuing them from the gender inequalities of Islamic law, some Muslim women
might object to the wholesale judicial disregard of Sharia as an intrusion upon their
rights. Simply put, it is not true that a woman is always financially better off under
American law than under Islamic law.
IV.	LOOKING FORWARD: THE IMPLICATIONS AND LIKELIHOOD OF AMERICAN
MUSLIM TRIBUNALS

There is a hollow mechanical aspect to the way that fiqh rules are depicted in
American courts. Fiqh is often treated as a static collection of legal rules to be quoted
and applied regardless of social context and circumstances. But for someone schooled
in Islamic jurisprudence, it would be awkward and insufficient to simply slice off the
classical rules from the books and apply them in the considerably different realities of
28. Alternatively, the husband must hire someone to do it, or do it himself. In the classical fiqh doctrine,

whether or not a woman was entitled to this compensation might depend on her social class. This
condition, however, may or may not be considered relevant to limit application of this rule today. Recent
divorce cases in Iran that awarded women this compensation do not seem to so limit it.

29. Not surprisingly, this is a common legal argument made by the husband if the mahr is quite small in

comparison to a very large marital estate. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Altayar, No. 57475-2-I, 2007 Wash.
App. LEXIS 2102, at *1 (Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (finding that a marriage contract containing a mahr of
nineteen gold coins was not a sufficient substitute for a prenuptial agreement because exchange of mahr
for equitable property distribution under Washington law was not fair).
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life in twenty-first century America. Fiqh lawmaking and adjudication requires not
just knowledge of the scripture and the doctrinal rules extrapolated from that
scripture, but also knowledge of the social context in which the rules are to be
applied. Thus, where social context changes, the fiqh often changes as well. Further,
Muslim judges also consider the practical consequences of applying a fiqh rule in a
given case.30 This brings up a question often asked within the American Muslim
community: Can Muslims in America access civil institutions that provide religious
advice, counseling, and dispute resolution from the perspective of Islam in America,
rather than fiqh rules imported from overseas? As the American Muslim community
grows and creates its own homegrown Islamic scholars, these civil institutions may
grow along with it.
In the arena of dispute resolution, some American Muslims have looked to the
American Jewish community for inspiration. That community has created a
successful alternative to presenting Jewish legal arguments in secular courts: the
Beth Din. As Professor Michael Broyde elucidates in his article, the Beth Din
arbitration tribunals offer Jewish Americans the option of resolving their disputes
before arbiters who are experts in both Jewish and American law and are aware of
the particular social realities of Jewish life in America today. 31 Would a Muslim
arbiter schooled in both Islamic law and American law similarly serve the American
Muslim community with a more nuanced and contextualized approach to Islamic
law that applies—perhaps even creates—different fiqh rules than the majority
opinions of classical fiqh? Possibly. It is by no means a certainty, but it is conceivable
that if Muslim equivalents of Beth Din tribunals were staffed by creative and
professionally trained Muslim arbiters, 32 a new body of uniquely American fiqh could
evolve out of these tribunals. Such fiqh could incorporate the realities of modern
Muslim life in the United States, such as racial equality, religious pluralism, the
absence of gendered public and private spaces, advanced medical technology, and so
on.33 These rules would provide powerful alternatives to the stagnant “ fiqh on the
books” currently quoted to American judges by expert witnesses in their courtrooms.
The possibility of Muslim American tribunals also provides food for thought for
Americans interested in supporting human rights and democracy in the Muslim
world. Those wanting to help “moderate Muslims” prevail over the intolerance and
30. For more on the role of a Muslim judge, see Asifa Quraishi, On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking

Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American Constitutional Law, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 339 (2009).

31.

See Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons Offered to Sharia Courts by the Beth Din of
American Precedent, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 287 (2012–2013).

32.

This caveat is crucial. The arbiters would have to be qualified to do independent ijtihad (Islamic legal
reasoning) in order for their fiqh to actively incorporate the relevant American context. Imams who only
apply existing, outdated fiqh of the classical books would arguably do more harm than good.

33.

I am not the first to make this suggestion. Similar thoughts have been expressed by, for example, Anver
Emon and Faisal Kutty, both writing in the context of the aborted Muslim tribunal project in Canada.
See Anver M. Emon, Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence and Multicultural
Accommodation, 87 Can. B. Rev. 391 (2008); Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in
Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7:3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 559
(2010).
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extremism of radical Muslims around the world might consider this: What if it’s not
about over there? What if it’s about over here? That is, what if the answer to extremist
understandings of Sharia is to drown them out with new and different fiqh rules—
rules that are just as authentically Islamic, but born in the open space of a free civil
society like the United States where the process of legal interpretation can evolve
naturally and creatively, not stifled by social and political forces? That is, if authentic,
sophisticated American Muslim tribunals existed in the West, then perhaps some34
of the new fiqh rules that would emerge from them would reflect American social
values like gender equality, human rights, and religious freedom. When that fiqh
goes out into the world, and American Muslim scholar-arbiters interact with Muslim
judges and scholars from other places, this could have powerful potential for
contributing to the global evolution of fiqh generally. It also might help facilitate a
new, authentically Muslim consensus on stalemate issues in international civil,
human, religious, and women’s rights discourses in ways that most western
policymakers and social activists have yet to appreciate.
None of this is likely to happen any time soon, however. I recognize that there is
simply too much resistance to Sharia (let alone Sharia tribunals) in the current
American political climate to make this a reality—despite our legal system’s openness
to religious alternative dispute resolution systems like the Beth Din. For empirical
evidence, we need look no further than Canada, where the recent planned addition
of Islamic arbitration tribunals to existing Jewish and Christian tribunals was revoked
after the announcement sparked public controversy. 35 At the moment, negative
associations with Sharia seem to be too strong in Western minds to leave any room
for understanding Sharia-based adjudication as a dynamic interpretive process that
allows for evolution and new fiqh rules. Given this reality, as well as the current
limited numbers of Islamic legal scholars who also hold an American law degree, we
are not likely to see the Muslim equivalents of Beth Din tribunals in the near future,
despite their potential even beyond the litigation needs of American Muslims. For
now, the status quo continues: American judges evaluate Sharia-based claims
presented by Muslim parties through expert testimony, and enforce what they
understand as long as it does not violate public policy.
V. CONCLUSION

Although the principle of “One Law for All”36 has powerful emotional appeal, it
is simply not the reality of law in the United States. Uniform federal law and the
Constitution are supreme, but within those boundaries, a great deal of legal diversity
exists, and American accommodation of religious law, within the limits of public
34. I say “some” here because I believe that, if these tribunals were to work, the principles of fiqh pluralism

would have to apply. That is, I do not imagine one central body of arbiters producing one collection of
new fiqh rules, but rather a diversity of fiqh interpretations reflecting the different ideologies of the
arbiters (ranging from conservative to liberal and otherwise) and those of the American Muslim public.

35.

See Kutty, supra note 33.

36. See One L. for All, supra note 1.
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policy, has always been part of that diversity. Many have pointed to this American
tradition with pride, arguing that the United States has a better approach than those
countries where secularism is coming to mean “assimilationism” and where religious
diversity is suffocated by aggressive laws restricting religious practices. The antiSharia movement in the United States seeks to similarly narrow the range of religious
practice legally protected by American courts.
The question presented by the anti-Sharia movement is therefore not really about
Sharia. It is about America. It is about what sorts of religious diversity our liberal
democracy chooses to honor. Will we continue to find ways to legally accommodate
the many different religious practices of our citizens, even when we don’t quite
understand or agree with them? Or will we move toward legal uniformity and
homogeneity and “One Law for All”? Given that America has never been a
homogeneous society, I hope that we choose the former, honoring individual freedom
whenever possible, despite the tough cases that will inevitably arise. I believe that
America is at its best when we find strength in our diversity, and especially when we
protect the diverse practices of our minorities. I believe our differences exist for us to
learn from, not to iron out. Muslim families following Sharia are part of that
diversity. American judicial accommodation of their requests should be something of
which Americans are proud, not afraid.
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